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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper aims to utilise a typological matrix as the basis to categorise various 
corporate-society interventions. It aims to argue that an instrumental version of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) is hegemonic in both the theoretical and normative domains of 
mainstream research, and that this hegemony underpins an intellectual blockage that prevents 
the field from achieving critical reflexivity and ultimately, a justifiable raison d'e^tre. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – The paper reflects on the extant CSR literature in the 
context of globalisation; presents a two-dimensional typological matrix to be used in 
positioning corporate-society interventions; provides examples of particular activities 
relevant to each quadrant of the matrix; and considers the wider political economy of CSR 
research. 
 
Findings – The logical implications of the corporation as an institution behaving in 
increasing accordance with the normative expectations of mainstream CSR scholarship will 
likely lead in the direction of increasing corporate hegemony. 
 
Practical implications – The paper proposes the adoption of the more theoretically coherent 
and empirically precise terms enlightened self-interest and corporate social irresponsibility in 
CSR and related research streams, as well as the institutional relocation of much future CSR 
research to disciplinary areas outside of the business school. 
 
Originality/value – The typological matrix presented in this paper offers a new way of 
locating corporate-society interventions. The partial abandonment of the term “CSR” by 
researchers, as well as the institutional relocations of much CSR research, are original 
notions. 
Introduction 
There have been several comprehensive reviews of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
and closely related literatures (i.e. stakeholder theory, corporate citizenship, corporate social 
performance) in recent years (Lee, 2008; Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Vogel, 2005). This 
paper sees no purpose in repeating such an exercise. Instead, a simple summary of the three 
most significant consensus findings which are useful in framing the central argument will 
suffice. 
First, despite the wide range of definitions available, there is no agreed upon definition of 
CSR among scholars or practitioners, nor does such agreement seem in any way immanent in 
either the academic or managerial communities. Carroll (1998), for example, defined CSR in 
terms of an ascending “pyramid” whose base was constituted by economic considerations 
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upon which legal, ethical and philanthropic elements were sequentially added. Schwartz and 
Carroll (2003) later integrated the ethical and philanthropic elements of this model. In a then-
comprehensive review of the literature, Wood (1991) defined CSR in the following manner: 
“The basic idea of corporate social responsibility is that business and society are interwoven 
rather than distinct entities; therefore, society has certain expectations for appropriate 
business behaviour and outcomes”. The task of defining the basic theoretical construct of 
CSR has not progressed further than these articulations. Second, in the aggregate there is no 
mass of evidence that CSR oriented behaviour by corporations negatively impacts economic 
performance (“the bottom line”). Third, there is some evidence (Vogel, 2005) to support the 
notion that CSR oriented behaviour has a positive – although not overly substantial – impact 
on firm-level economic performance, although there are strong claims for an “industry effect” 
in operation here (Porter and Kramer, 2006). 
The importance of these findings is clear in terms of management practice. The ambiguity of 
the relationship between CSR activities and corporate social performance leaves executives a 
significant amount of “room to manoeuvre”, as there is no clear negative impact from 
undertaking many CSR initiatives. Chief executive officers (CEOs) thus have some license to 
embark on projects that allocate usually incremental resources to benefit selected 
stakeholders within and beyond the boundaries of the corporation. What is primarily achieved 
by such initiatives is a “feel good” factor – among employees, customers or the executives 
themselves – which ostensibly generates increased levels of engagement, loyalty, and/or 
productivity among impacted stakeholders to the benefit of corporate reputation and 
ultimately, economic performance (this is almost always the explicit or implicit rationale 
behind CSR actions). 
Following Gioia (1999), the author would stress the potential existential drivers of such 
actions amongst the contemporary generation of CEOs, many of whom not only want to 
create “shareholder value” but also desperately desire to “give something back” to the wider 
society – particularly where such laudable actions have no discernibly negative impact on 
their firms' financial performance. CSR thus becomes a sort of “holy grail” for some 
executives, helping to instil purpose in their organisations but also in their personal identities. 
It allows the self-reflective CEO, aware to some degree of his/her alienation from other 
organisational actors, the wider society, and even themselves (Rinehart, 2006), to seek to 
attenuate that alienation through actions consistent with the “public good”. 
A recent review which provides effective framing for this paper is provided by The 
Economist's “Special report on corporate social responsibility” appearing in the 19 January 
2008 issue. Here, the authors observe that the CSR literature is constituted by three 
discernable layers, “one on top of the other”: traditional corporate philanthropy driven by 
ethical imperatives independent of any business rationality; defensively minded approaches 
grouped under the rubric of “risk management”, oriented to protect the reputations of 
corporate brands from activities which may undermine them thru social and/or environmental 
abuses (often catalysed by the activities of oppositional non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs)); and most recently, research which supports the notion of “doing well by doing 
good”, arguing that CSR can be part of a value creation strategy for businesses that adopt it 
and integrate it with their overall competitive differentiation strategies (Porter and Kramer, 
2006). This last approach The Economist correlates to the traditional notion of enlightened 
self-interest (ESI) so clearly elaborated by Friedman (1970). 
The changing context of corporate-society interventions 
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This section will examine how the impact of globalisation and related developments with 
respect to the state and the transnational corporation (TNC) have altered the context of 
corporate-society interventions. The author will use the term “intervention” here because the 
focus of interest is on the causal impact of the corporation on society, not the other way 
round. This is consistent with the general thrust of the CSR literature, which is chiefly 
concerned with the impact of corporate activities on the wider society, and the corresponding 
implications of undertaking such activities for the corporation's financial health and overall 
reputation. The author would also note at the commencement of this section that the primary 
focus is on listed corporations of Anglo-Saxon origin, as well as any other TNCs, which are 
listed on stock exchanges in Anglo-Saxon countries. Such organisations exhibit the greatest 
tendencies to manage for maximum shareholder value due to the institutional condition of 
financial hegemony (Fligstein, 1990; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985) which structures the 
organisational fields within which they operate. 
Commenting on the increased power enjoyed by TNCs relative to both states and labour due 
to the “global shift” (Dicken, 2003) in recent decades, Jones (1999, p. 38) observes: 
[I]t is crucial for governments to understand the essential institutional logic of TNCs, which 
stems from the fact that they are fundamentally sociotechnical systems designed, constructed, 
and maintained to make money for the interests that own them. TNCs are not development 
institutions, although they often promote certain forms of economic development (usually in 
terms of their own choosing, rather than in terms of what is appropriate for host societies). 
Governments therefore need to address the effects of TNC investment as being fundamentally 
contingent on factors such as timing, geographical location, and industry structure. Hence, the 
consequent need for pragmatic policy approaches to dealing with these institutions in a way 
which encourages them to generate as much value-added (including generating positive 
externalities) as possible within particular geographical spaces. That is, to make them act as if 
they were development institutions, as (self-interested) partners in development. 
States, however, are not only to be understood in terms of their relative autonomy (from 
capital) shrinking due to the increasingly blatant extent to which globalisation places them in 
direct competition with each other for foreign investment (although this aspect is probably 
the single most salient development of recent years). Still another aspect of the evolving role 
of the state is noted by Jones (2003, p. 168): 
Most advanced states have in the post-September 11 period substantially increased the 
information they collect on individuals, expanded police powers, and rescinded various civil 
liberties and protections afforded to citizens and employees. An argument can be made that 
“the state” is evolving in a post-democratic direction, or possibly devolving around an early-
modern set of functions focusing on maintaining social order through force (and the ritual 
display of force) […] Perhaps, we are in the midst of a transformation in which the state is 
becoming the primary disciplinary mechanism for global capital, while its other (social 
equity) functions are either shifted to alternative institutions (such as the TNC) or terminated 
altogether? 
More recently, Jones and Fleming (2008) observe that the dominance of TNCs does not 
marginalise the state, since the former fundamentally rely upon a reconfigured version of 
state power to maintain their activities, as capitalism cannot reproduce itself. The state still 
continues (in most situations) to perform vital systemic functions such as absorbing 
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externalities, maintaining law and order, and related legitimation oriented activities 
(Habermas, 1973). 
In a global context, the author would also acknowledge the rising power of NGOs such as 
Greenpeace, Amnesty International and similar organisations as major players in the 
“asymmetrical geometry” (Castells, 1996), increasingly characterising the global “playing 
field”. NGOs appear as potentially significant stakeholders in all of the recent reviews of the 
CSR literature cited earlier. Normatively, corporations are advised to incorporate relevant 
NGOs within their stakeholder management strategies at the very least as a form of risk 
management. Proactive corporations, meanwhile, are pointed to coordinate their activities 
with NGOs in areas of mutual interest. The institutional role of NGOs is relatively clear – to 
further the agenda of their donors/supporters, independently of governmental and corporate 
interests. However, the internal organisational logic of NGOs (i.e. to survive and grow 
(Thompson, 1967)) can sometimes compromise their ostensible institutional role, resulting in 
the equivalent of “regulatory capture” (Dal Bo, 2006) as their agendas, organisational 
“brands”, and (sometimes) even their employees are coopted by astute corporations. This will 
become an increasingly common operational hazard for NGOs as corporations become more 
sophisticated and proactive in their dealings concerning matters of environmental 
sustainability, human rights and corporate citizenship (Matten and Crane, 2005). 
Categorising corporate-society interventions: the business activity impact matrix 
The author would suggest that the normative stance adopted by many CEOs and 
“responsible” organisations outlined earlier promotes an instrumental CSR in which 
corporations provide lip-service to community input apropos their policies (e.g. UK-based 
Tesco's policy of “consulting” local businesses before establishing a new supermarket in 
Great Britain). This is because it is simply not in the interests of capitalist firms to be 
democratically accountable to their stakeholders. Such democratising attributes of corporate 
citizenship initiatives begin to look more like instrumental CSR campaigns designed to 
enhance shareholder value (Habish et al., 2005). By being “good corporate citizens”, firms 
can proactively anticipate and deter government regulations, exploit opportunities arising 
from increasing levels of cultural, environmental and sexual awareness, and differentiate their 
products from their less socially responsible competitors. The author would argue that such 
an instrumental version of CSR is hegemonic in both the theoretical and normative domains 
of mainstream research, and that this hegemony constitutes the fundamental intellectual 
blockage that prevents the field from achieving critical reflexivity and, ultimately, a 
justifiable raison d'ettre. 
A more sustained analysis of instrumental CSR will clarify this point regarding the strategic 
incentives and disincentives for firms to become accountable for outcomes which fall outside 
the realm of “market-based competition”. Assuming (bounded) economic rationality, TNCs 
can be expected to undertake and sustain CSR activities and initiatives only under certain 
conditions (McWilliams and Siegal, 2001). Following Jensen and Meckling (1976), if a firm's 
governance structure is functioning properly with respect to prioritising shareholder/owner 
interests (in Anglo-Saxon business systems), management should only pursue those CSR 
strategies/projects which are designed to enhance or protect the position of the firm across the 
multiple market and non-market environments in which it operates. 
Operating in accordance with instrumental principles would sanction “genuine” CSR actions 
where targeted stakeholders received certain benefits (e.g. a new community centre, citizen 
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rights that could be provided at a profit), as well as ideological deployments of CSR (e.g. 
“voluntary” advertising restraints on cigarette packaging to pre-empt more draconian 
government regulation, token gestures of community input regarding a firm's activities). 
This behavioural imperative can be usefully depicted in the following typological business 
activity impact matrix (BAIM) from Jones (2007). The vertical axis of the matrix measures 
net “impact on society” (or on a subset of particular stakeholders) of an activity undertaken 
by a focal business from strongly positive to strongly negative. The horizontal axis similarly 
measures net (economic) “impact on firm” from strongly positive to strongly negative (Figure 
1). 
This descriptive review will commence with an examination of quadrant I on the lower left of 
the matrix. This quadrant is referred to as “pathologies” because it incorporates outcomes 
which are negative both for the wider society – or at least some stakeholder groups – as well 
as for the firm whose actions are primarily responsible for the outcomes. Among the types of 
activities/outcomes that would be represented in this quadrant are cases of criminal fraud 
such as Enron. However, not all activities in this quadrant would necessarily be illegal; nor 
would all forms of illegal activities be limited to this quadrant. For example, recent heavy 
fines by the American federal government against British Airways for price-fixing in its 
transatlantic airfreight operations represent a stark case of a corporation knowingly breaking 
the law in pursuit of financial advantage (The Guardian, 2008). 
On the upper left of the matrix, quadrant II is titled “public goods” as it is a container for 
outcomes which benefit the wider society but represent negative returns to the sponsoring 
firm; that is, no net payback in terms of reputation, employee satisfaction, competitive 
differentiation and/or share price appreciation which offset the time, energy and money of the 
firm's efforts are evident. Leavitt (1958) long ago noted the dangers associated with 
corporations undertaking activities that were the proper domain of governmental and civic 
organisations such as labour unions, churches and schools. In general, the author would 
expect government, civic organisations and the voluntary sector to be most active in this 
quadrant, although there will also be a substantial presence of non-listed businesses whose 
owners have a preference for altruism. Importantly, representation of listed corporations in 
this quadrant would constitute a governance failure and de facto hijack of shareholder wealth 
by unilateral management actions. 
On the lower right of the matrix is quadrant III, bearing the title of “corporate social 
irresponsibility” (CSI) This container includes outcomes which generate some manner of 
payback for the firm that commits the directive actions, with damages inflicted on the wider 
society or given stakeholder groups. Various types of negative externalities generated by 
business activity are salient here, ranging from the exploitation and alienation of workers, to 
the degradation of the natural environment, to the commodification of culture – all in the 
name of profit. While some of these actions may on occasion be criminal in nature, most 
often they occur within legal boundaries, if not within acceptable normative codes of 
conduct. Literal readings of Friedman (1970) would place his central arguments in this 
quadrant. The author would disagree, locating him instead in quadrant IV, which will be 
examined next. 
Finally, on the upper right of the matrix is quadrant IV, labelled ESI. This quadrant is home 
to those actions which generate the proverbial “win-win” situations, as when Microsoft's 
donation activities function to some extent to ameliorate the reputational damage caused by 
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its predatory competitive behaviours, at the same time unquestionably benefiting the 
recipients of new computer labs, IT training, tertiary scholarships, etc. Vogel (2005) notes in 
a recent review that decades of investigation have failed to confirm (or reject) 
comprehensively the intuitively compelling notion that “doing well by doing good” – or the 
more blatant pronouncement by Jeff Immult (CEO of General Electric) that “green is good” – 
can serve as an important foundation of executive thinking. Nevertheless, this unverified 
sentiment is rapidly becoming a mantra in the corporate discourse, fuelled now by the 
consulting industry on the one hand and “ethical” fund analysts and managers on the other. 
Clearly, quadrant IV is the normative destination for the way business should behave, but the 
rhetoric appears to be considerably ahead of the empirical realty of most business-society 
interventions. 
The vast majority of recent theoretical, normative and empirical research on CSR would fall 
into quadrant IV, including high profile publications by Porter (2002), Porter and Kramer 
(2006) and Vogel (2005), as well as increasing output from consultancies such as Mckinsey 
& Company (2006). Actions undertaken in the name of concepts such as “strategic corporate 
philanthropy” (Porter, 2002), social entrepreneurship (The Economist, 2008) and corporate 
citizenship (Matten and Crane, 2005) would also constitute quadrant IV activities. All are 
manifestations of the instrumental (Jones, 1996) pursuit of ESI of particular 
institutional/organisational actors – nothing more, nothing less. This is consistent with Lee's 
(2008) observation that recent CSR research places “excessive emphasis” on corporate social 
performance and the “business case” to the exclusion of more fundamental ethical, 
institutional and sociological issues. 
Clearly, Friedman (1970) would approve of any corporate actions located in quadrant IV. In 
fact, this quadrant validates that most precious mantra of “free market” ideology: that the 
“invisible hand” truly will drive arrangements which are optimal for both firm and society. 
The author would not dispute the empirical salience of quadrant IV. But the author would 
question its empirical magnitude vs the other quadrants currently and in terms of key trends 
in the global political economy. Also, the author would caution stakeholders in all 
institutional locations not to get “carried away” with the notion that CSR and related 
activities always fall within this quadrant, thus mitigating the need for the formation and 
maintenance of effective countervailing forces to the corporate sector in government, labour 
organisations, NGOs and the like. Such exuberance supports a naïve and dangerous idealism 
in much CSR research. What is needed is an empirically grounded and institutionally 
informed critical realism, a theme which will be elaborated on at the conclusion of this paper. 
This framework can be usefully employed to position respective CSR theories as well as 
specific organisational strategies and empirical outcomes. Some important empirical 
questions relating to this typology include determining the scope of each quadrant (which 
will vary depending on the geographical level of analysis and industry, among other factors), 
relevant trends going forward – particularly considering the impact of globalisation and the 
activities of TNCs – and the key agents, strategies and processes for expanding quadrant IV 
outcomes. The author would argue that addressing such empirical questions should be a focus 
of activity for CSR and corporate citizenship scholars, as well as the normative role of 
convincing corporate stakeholders that they can expand the scope of quadrant IV (e.g. 
witness the effect of the “bottom of the pyramid” discourse on TNC actions with respect to 
emerging markets in recent years). 
CSR through a looking glass, darkly … 
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The author would suggest that the logical implications of the corporation as an institution 
behaving in increasing accordance with the normative expectations of mainstream CSR 
scholarship (as well as other more influential voices in the corporate, consulting and 
investment funds sectors) will likely lead in the direction of some form of corporatism, which 
Wikipedia (2008) defines as follows: 
Corporatism or neo-corporatism is often used popularly as a pejorative term in reference to 
perceived tendencies in politics for legislators and administrations to be influenced or 
dominated by the interests of business enterprises, employers' organisations, and trade 
groups. The influence of other institutions, such as labour unions, is perceived to be relatively 
minor. In this view, government decisions are seen as being influenced strongly by which 
sorts of policies will lead to greater profits for favoured companies […] Corporatism is also 
used to describe a condition of corporate-dominated globalisation. Points enumerated by 
users of the term in this sense include the prevalence of very large multinational corporations 
that freely move operations around the world in response to corporate, rather than public, 
needs; the push by the corporate world to introduce legislation and treaties which would 
restrict the abilities of individual nations to restrict corporate activity; and similar measures to 
allow corporations to sue nations over “restrictive” policies, such as a nation's environmental 
regulations that would restrict corporate activities. 
The author would also suggest that research scholars consider abandoning the use of CSR in 
both theoretical and normative usages, confining it to those empirical cases in which 
organisational actors themselves use the language of CSR to signify their motives or actions. 
The author's rationale here is twofold. First, CSR has not and cannot – because of its 
contestability among various power configurations – be defined with either precision or 
consensus. Second, the CSR discourse has been implicated in performing a “masking” 
operation for corporate interests for many years (Jones, 1996; Reich, 2007). As was exhibited 
in the earlier discussion of the typological matrix, CSR is neither necessary nor useful as a 
badge for quadrant IV actions and outcomes. It is in fact rather redundant and, if anything, 
adds a layer of “smoke and mirrors” to behaviours which are otherwise much more accurately 
signified by the term “enlightened self-interest”. 
A similar point is made in the recent review of CSR by The Economist (2008, p. 22), which 
observes that large corporations are embarking on ever more CSR activities as reactions to 
disparate developments including corporate scandals (e.g. Enron), increasingly powerful 
NGOs, the war for talent, and climate change. Most corporations adopt CSR in order to 
protect or enhance their reputations with respect to key stakeholder groups. Therefore, 
“paying attention to CSR can amount to ESI, something that over time will help to sustain 
profits for shareholders”. 
In a recent review of CSR, Lee (2008) stresses the extent to which CSR research is 
increasingly focused on the link between CSR and financial performance, to the exclusion of 
wider and deeper issues that pertain to ethics, society and the institutional order. The author 
would go further, arguing that mainstream CSR scholars have allowed themselves to be the 
victims of discursive capture by the instrumental allure of the “business case” perspective 
(Vogel, 2005). The author would explain this development as analogous to the phenomena of 
“regulatory capture” often observed in studies of the symbiotic relationships that typically 
emerge between regulator and regulatee (Dal Bo, 2006). 
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The next task to consider is that of linking the call for disentangling the study of CSR – from 
muddled usages of the term in conceptual scholarship, as well as from the institutional 
location of the business school – to the matrix developed in this paper. This results in the 
following normative suggestions for the continuing scholarly investigation of phenomena in 
the domain of CSR, stakeholder management and corporate citizenship. Note that the author 
is not understating the importance of studying CSR and corporate citizenship as increasingly 
significant topics of theoretical and empirical enquiry, but rather questioning the institutional 
location and identity of those best placed to examine these phenomena from an independent 
and critical perspective. The author feels that the business school is an appropriate home for 
the research of only a subset of the topic areas identified on the matrix, as there is little doubt 
that the “relative autonomy” of scholars working from this base is minimal; that their efforts 
must somehow justify themselves in an instrumental business calculus (Jones, 1995). Many 
areas of enquiry are better left to scholars working outside the business school, as follows. 
First, the author believes that theoretical, empirical and normative efforts linked to quadrant 
IV (ESI) is the proper domain of business school-based investigation. The author would 
recommend all efforts in this area be undertaken within the discipline of strategic 
management, as it is here in which CSR and related topics are achieving visibility at the 
highest levels of management and increasingly being integrated into corporate and business-
level strategies (McKinsey Quarterly, 2006; Porter and Kramer, 2006). The corollary 
implication is that current CSR oriented scholars would need to “retool” to be able to better 
engage in productive conversations with their strategic management colleagues, into whose 
academic departments or groups they would be relocated. These scholars would spend their 
time conceptualising, empirically examining and/or normatively advocating the “business 
case” for CSR, corporate citizenship, etc. 
Second, quadrant II (public goods) should be the proper domain of applied ethics and legal 
scholars, both based outside the institutional confines of the business school. Ethics scholars 
are equipped to theoretically and normatively grapple with altruism by individuals as well as 
corporate philanthropy (understood here as “pure” corporate giving with no expectation of 
any manner of “return”). Meanwhile, legal scholars can critically examine corporate 
philanthropy from the perspective of circumstances generating and supporting dysfunctional 
governance mechanisms which enable management to (illegally) spend “others people's 
money” in pursuit of agendas which are not aligned with economic performance (Jenson, 
2005). The author would invoke the same logic to call for corporate governance scholars to 
incorporate quadrant I (pathologies) within their domain of enquiry. 
Third, the author believes that quadrant III (CSI) is the proper domain of organisational 
theory scholars – possibly based in business schools but more appropriately (due to concerns 
of relative autonomy) based in sociology departments – dealing with organisational and inter-
organisational phenomena, and political economy researchers (obviously based well outside 
of the business school) concerned with developments at the institutional level. This quadrant, 
where firms act in ways that generate benefits for a narrow group of proprietary stakeholders 
but negative externalities for the wider society, cannot be as effectively studied from within 
the institutional location of the business school due to fundamental ideological-discursive 
constraints influencing research funded and conducted in this context. For example, the 
consideration of genuinely critical theories of the business firm and its institutional function 
in contemporary capitalist society are simply beyond the capacity of business school 
researchers to interrogate due to the disciplinary composition of constituent faculties, 
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particularly in North America, which is itself increasingly influenced (at senior levels) by 
major corporate donors. Imagine, for example, the “Wal-Mart Chair of Business Ethics”! 
Relatedly, the author would also argue that only critical political economy can usefully 
conceptualise quadrant I events as anything other than isolated “pathologies”. In fact, events 
such as the current global banking instability triggered by the “sub-prime” crisis in the USA 
can best be understood not as a system dysfunction but rather as an historically typical and 
emblematic example of the “system” functioning normally. The channelling of public 
resources (subsidies) to support the activities of the leading entrepreneurial organisations of 
the financial sector by a national government which is structurally dependent on the corporate 
sector (Alford and Friedland, 1985) is perfectly foreseeable from this theoretical perspective, 
with numerous historical precedents (DuBoff, 1989). 
Conclusion 
This paper has employed a typological matrix from Jones (2007) as the basis to categorise 
various theoretical, normative and empirical streams of CSR and related research and 
practice. The author would argue that an instrumental version of CSR is hegemonic in both 
the theoretical and normative domains of mainstream research, and that this hegemony 
constitutes the fundamental intellectual blockage that prevents the field from achieving 
critical reflexivity and, ultimately, a justifiable raison d'ettre. 
In summary, there seems to be a kind of “great forgetting” evident in mainstream CSR (and 
related) research wherein the original rationality for the joint stock corporation – to facilitate 
the raising of investment capital for growth and to limit the legal liability (that is, the 
responsibility) of owner-shareholders – is somehow lost amongst calls for corporations to 
become ever more responsible, either out of moral or instrumental impulses. The author 
would submit that scholars should no longer inadvertently participate in the propagation of a 
de facto neo-corporatist ideology which promises more than it can ever deliver, while 
undermining the formation and resiliency of countervailing forces and, ultimately, 
democracy. 
It is hoped that this paper will stimulate further research in three ways: 
1. By initiating a debate on the appropriate institutional locations of CSR theoretical and 
empirical research. 
2. By challenging the conceptual (vs ideological) utility of the term “corporate social 
responsibility” in academic research on business-society interventions. 
3. By stimulating efforts to establish the empirical parameters of the four quadrants of 
the BAIM. 
Future efforts to address any or all of these “challenges” would constitute welcome signs of a 
critical turn in business and society research. 
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